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Translation and Criticism 
Frederic Will 
At a conference in Paris, in March, 1967, I heard Polish and French poets and 
translators discuss the problems of translation. Their immediate theme was three 
anthologies of recent Polish poetry translated into English, French, and German 
respectively. But they went, of course, quickly and far out beyond the topic at 
hand. To their efforts at discussing the problems of translation was added a strik 
ing piquancy: that much of the conference's discussion of translation was car 
ried on by means of translation. That situation made the whole event more 
meaningful than I could quite analyze. 
The discussers were thereby put into an unusual position. Some of their 
analyses were communicated to one another in a medium or form which was 
an 
example of the thing they were discussing. The conditions of their act of 
communication were the most 
eloquent comment to be made on the contents of 
their communication. Not only the difficulty of translation was illustrated, by that 
situation; but also the fact that even in talking about translation we go out be 
yond our analyses, and forget how difficult it is for us even to discuss the diffi 
culty of understanding one another across language barriers. 
It is in various ways worth thinking about what kinds of alleviation trans 
lation can be, to the burden of language barriers. We often think it can provide 
equivalents, in 
a new 
language, for what 
was written in another language. This 
concept of equivalents 
or 
equivalence needs 
a close look, for it opens the door 
to a flock of confusions. I have fought with the idea already, but it is well 
worth 
returning to here. 
'Equivalence' usually means, in the kind of case I am thinking of, 'value in 
a new language which is like and worth the value of that from which the trans 
lation was made, the original.' I have already examined some of the roots?onto 
logical and political?of this conviction: here I simply state it. Sometimes this 
conviction joins with the belief that translations can deal very freely with their 
originals, and sometimes with the opposite belief, that translations must be very, 
as it is called, 'literal.' Either of these views, and a spectrum of possibilities lying 
between them, can be supported by the kind of equivalence-conviction I describe. 
These 
opposed views have in common, in the present case, the conviction that 
they represent ways of establishing equivalence. 
There is an alternative to this definition, or at least another way of looking at 
it; a view of translation which if not original is at least unorthodox, which is 
backed up by many contexts, and which has the merit of describing translation's 
relation to the main landmass of 
meaningful uses of language. 
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Translation deserves, under certain conditions, to be considered an exten 
sion of an 
original work, quite as literally as we sometimes consider literary 
criticism or literary scholarship 
an extension of literature itself. I mean by exten 
sion 
something entirely different from translation 
as variation or imitation (in 
Robert Lowell's sense), in which great latitude is provided for interpretation. 
'Interpretation is a frightening word. The notion of it returns us to the duller 
aspects of equivalence, the non-ontological aspects. I mean at this point to 
con 
sider translation as a continuation of the impulse latent in an original. 
From the shelf I pick a book by Ren? Char and read: 
Le po?te ne s'irrite pas de l'extinction hideuse 
de la mort, mais confiant en son toucher particulier 
transforme toute chose en laines prolong?es, 
and then, translated on the opposite page: 
The poet is not angry at the hideous extinction 
of death, but confident of his own particular touch, 
he transforms 
everything into long wools. 
The ineptitude of this translation results from giving in to the most pedestrian 
sense of 
equivalence. But what use would even a more creative sense of equiva 
lence have been here? Of what interest could it have been in this case even to 
imitate (in Lowell's sense) imaginatively? One could hardly have done more 
than, say, make daringly explicit the maggoty, spindly aspects of physical death. 
This would have helped, but could perhaps best h?Ve been achieved by creative 
translation out from the center of the French. Like this, for a start: 
The shaper of poems (1) is not rawed by (2) the tangible strangle 
grasp (3) of death, but turns it (4), trusting his touch, into fingers 
(5), endurable skeins. 
One may head, first, for the dominant sense-experience of the original, which 
here is tactile. (Not amorphous and indifferent, as the equivalent-version sug 
gests). Then the hints from the original begin to accumulate. One realizes what 
to do with the 'laines prolong?es,' that they can be related to 'toucher.' Hence 
'fingers' (5) and 'skeins.' One goes for etymological or cultural resonances (as 
in 1, 2, 3) which convey the original's sense of effort and texture. One specifies 
(4) where the original could afford to be general in its reference: with its 
'toute chose' which the 
equivalent translation simply waters down. In short, even 
in my rough version of 
an extension-translation, one may follow up a variety of 
promptings, in the original, in 
an 
attempt to continue its work, not to find an 
equivalent of it. 
Such a program of ad hoc strategies may wander off into anarchy. One can 
go wild picking up all the hints, and be left in the end with a picnic of linguistic 
oddities. This would be following a too private course. What I said, concerning 
the dominant sense-pressure of this passage, may serve as a clue to kinds of 
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shaping available here to the translator. 
In the present passage the problem is relatively simple, as it is in all poetry 
or 
poetic prose which springs from a strongly internalized sense-experience. The 
texture of the chief component sense will in the reader make itself promptly 
clear. Usually, though, no so obviously organizational thread is laid down, 
as is 
clear in 
considering, say, La Divina Commedia, Andromaque, or Les Fleurs du 
Mal. In those cases one must listen. Felt senses of 
motion?upward, downward, in 
ward, outward?will in Dante join the moral issues so as to suggest strategies, or 
recurrent tropes, of linguistic behavior. A lyric poet, like Baudelaire, might need 
to be approached through puns or sound-patterns, whose suggestibility seemed 
at first quite random, but on second reading turned out to be crucial clues. 
(Think of the sense-and-sound play between 'soeur' and 'douceur,' LIII, or be 
tween end-rhymes like 'tige' and 'vertige,' XL VIL) 
That this sketch of a program is worth considering grows convincing only 
when one considers, in its light, what it is that work with another language, 
through translation, 
can 
accomplish. As translator, one has first to penetrate 
an 
other language with his 
own. This sounds odd, but is true. 'Po?te' and 'hideuse' 
and 'mort' are necessarily addressed, by us, through the English words which 
have introduced us to those three 
specific meaning-giving signs. 'Po?te' first 
means, to us, in terms of 
'poet.' Secondly it means, to us, through what 
we 
may 
happen subsequently to know of its roots {potetes, 'the maker,' in Greek), its 
cultural resonances, or its tonal qualities. Third, of course, it 
means all this 
through what it gathers and bestows significance from, in its context in its own 
work. 
One job of the translator, especially of the translator of the poetic, is to 
nourish and foster any or all of these meanings, letting them grow from their 
original soil out through his words into their natural deployment, or at least 
into one of their possible unfoldings. Similarly with the whole meaning of the 
original poem, story, or play. We need to let it flower into our words. 
'Our'? It would be too little to say that this view treats translation as a 
means to 
extending our own language. I am convinced of at least that. I see 
many cases in which the language of translation should clash with the norms of 
the speech and writing system from which it emerges. (Zukofsky's translations 
of Catullus are a brilliant example of total clash.) This kind of clash can be ex 
tremely fruitful to any language, as we know in English from the effects of our 
greatest translations?Chapman's and Pope's of Homer, the King James Bible, 
Fitzgerald's Rubaiyat?all of which have moved the boundaries of our language 
farther out around us, so that we breathe more freely inside it. 
I am on the whole, though, thinking of nothing so grand, when I speak of 
letting the words of the original flower into your words; yet I am thinking of 
something intimately, densely, and experimentally concerned with language ex 
tension. I think of the way one can enter the foreign language, and work out 
with it into a number of its intentions, especially into its guiding intention. Finally 
I think of the possibilities of occupying, in this way, some of the no man's land 
which lies between languages, or some of that tertium quid territory which con 
stitutes the ideal language between the particular languages. This means bring 
ing the foreign language toward one's 
own language. It involves extending one's 
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own language, but doing that through building a bridge back into one's own 
language from a foreign language one has gone out into. The notion of equiva 
lence offers us the false idea of balance in values in different languages. Al 
though such translations 
as I've discussed here may never give the sense of com 
pleteness, they 
are incomplete only because they 
are permanently in 
a state of 
creative 
emergence from what is being translated. What they emerge toward is 
that single, universal language which each of us bears deep in him, as the theo 
retical horizon which makes linguistic actuality possible. 
From a translation of a realistic novelist which would in any sense be ade 
quate, to a similar kind of translation of Ren? Char, would be a great distance. 
I am conscious of having allowed for translation in both these senses. I'm also 
aware that earlier in this essay, where I was trying to establish a context?philo 
sophical and historical?for the free and liberal employment of translation, I was 
also creating a context which would support a far more conventional view of the 
activity. A world of public literary matter, to which attention was called there, 
is no more invitation to Christopher Logue than it would be to a translator of 
Zola. Each of them could find, in publica materies, justification for his own pro 
cedure as translator. 
This essay has hinted, so far, at a remarkable kind of possibility for trans 
lation, and I should like to let my conclusion circle about that possibility, rather 
than come to rest on a balanced and equable relativism, of the kind justified by 
the last two sentences of the preceding paragraph. (Though the point made 
through that relativism seems to me made to stand. ) 
There is certainly nothing wrong in certain cases with equivalence-trans 
lation of prose, nor is there anything sacrosanct in developing the intentions of 
the 
original, whether poetry or prose, a business which in most hands?some 
times, say, in Pound's?leads to fatuously ungrounded results. The latter activity 
is, however, certainly the more daring and fertile of the two, and if 
we can at 
the same time find, in it, plausible hints of methods, we may be learning 
some 
thing valuable about all kinds of translation. It deserves 
a final try. 
The plausible hints lie hidden in the direction of the translator's work; back 
into the original, then out again in the direction proposed by it. Certainly, be 
cause I haven't been that careful at definition, this verbal movement is likely to 
sound like a very daring 'following the curve of the original,' and in a sense I 
suppose it is. But in the example from Char, which I consciously kept small and 
unambitious, less than that was shown going on and what was shown 
seems to 
me to have been the necessary minimum, for translation which makes any 
claims on us. (Particularly claims of accuracy.) What was going on was, on one 
level, a kind of etymological busy work; as in the movement back into 'po?te,' 
's'irriter,' or 'extinction.' But that busywork was part of finding out what 
was in 
the 
original, and letting it assume its basic meanings again. In 'laines prolong?es,' 
already, more was done. Also, I think, in the turning of 'transforme' into 'turns 
it.' From 
etymologizing on up, at that point, translation means bringing back, 
into a version of the 
original, some of its toughness, density, 
or texture. 
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This much, I believe, was being done even in the 'flattest' or 'straightest' 
instances of prose translation. I know that was one of the motives behind the 
making of successive versions of the short story Fama. To say 
a lot in nuce, 
that is what I was after when in translating that Polish story I changed 
Mr. Posag, coming downstairs to the men's room, was the nearest 
to the monument, which behaved so unusually, and he saw most 
clearly how Fama moved her hand, raised the horn to her lips, and 
gave a sharp sound 
into 
Mr. Posag, who 
was 
coming downstairs to the men's room, was the 
nearest to the monument when it behaved so unusually, and it was he 
who saw most clearly how Fama moved her hand, raised the horn 
to her lips, and blew sharply. 
It was not all I was after?because I was also concerned with a kind of inner 
sayability in English?but it was part. I was after a moderate restoration of the 
original's vital qualities. 
Basic restoration, then, may be a suitable formula for the moment, and 
may help, once more, to remove any sense that translation is inadequate unless 
it achieves a radical freedom. A quite different sense, I think, should ride in 
the wake of this formula; the sense of the function of translation as a kind of 
criticism, or at least as an activity significantly related to criticism. 
On the busywork level again, translation of the 'basic' kind is a process of 
constant choice, and is thus, from the outset, 'critical,' 'judgmental,' in recognized 
senses of those terms. The decision whether to write 
'gave 
a 
sharp sound' or 'blew 
sharply' is a complicated, if not very interesting, case of such basic criticism. The 
decision involves our notions of the whole context of the phrase?thus of the 
work involved, and ideally, by extension, of the author's whole oeuvre; all this 
involves, of course, our ears' sharpness, our linguistic preparation, and our 
sense 
of ambience and mood in lived life. On this busywork level, translation involves 
deciding what effect a work is aiming at; and defending one's decision by show 
ing proof. A lot of what we usually consider practical criticism certainly does 
no more, and not much differently, than that. 
Is translation ever more than that kind of busywork? Translation of any 
critical worth is not only phrase-by-phrase work modified by an active know 
ing of the whole text; but it is both of those activities working together. What is 
hard to analyze is this: that the joining of those two activities, if carried out 
by the process of restoration of the original's vitality, seems to constitute some 
thing like the creative process that went into making the original. Not only is 
this 
seeming hard to analyze, but it needs analysis. Surely we don't want to 
admit that good translations, works of good criticism in that sense, 
are as creative 
as the original creations to which they are applied. 
We don't, just as we naturally reject the idea that good discursive criticism 
?from Aristotle to Lukacs to Frye?somehow makes itself equal' to a body of 
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literature by accounting for it. What marks the original literary work, in all cases, 
is a density and texture which are unique to it. The translation at best is criti 
cism which renders a kind of account of these factors. But it is not a becoming 
them, in accounting for them. 
As that, translation in its critical function remains a kind of guardian of our 
concern for 
significant literature. It gives an account of such literature, and is 
thus, at its most ambitious, as aspiring as the most aspiring of the discursive 
works which we usually agree to call criticism. And that is not, at this point, to 
speak of translation as creation. If the meaning of translation as 'account' is 
still not yet fully worked out, it is nevertheless clearly distinct from 'creation.' 
Where one act in words, translation, begins to transform itself into 
an 
other, criticism, it is likely that we will be especially able to see what the first, 
the departing, was. It is a privileged moment. 
That moment was invited, in the last- paragraphs, by an attempt to probe 
the difference between translation and criticism, as different kinds of account of 
original texts. 
I suppose we need once more, in order to take this distinction farther, to 
invoke the insubstantiality of original texts. We need to think again, before dis 
cussing accounts fully, about what in such 
cases we are giving an account of. 
Original texts are not icons. They are symbolically coded patterns of move 
ment; intention, argument, and the expression of both, theme. They are neither 
hard nor soft, but are basically process. I like to think of them as participial, 
rather than nounlike or verblike. Works of literature, there to translate, have a 
character, a nature each by each, which is like their substance, their mark of 
personality; but they can make this substance clear, indeed actual, only by en 
acting it. That action is their verblike side, needed to reveal the nouns in them. 
In this sense they, literary originals, are participles. They enact the 
nouns they 
are, by becoming verbs. They become verbs by enacting the nouns they are. 
I touched these factors in hinting at the problem of translating, in general 
and at all. I mention them now for a new purpose: to assure us of continuing 
directly into this last question of how or whether translation differs from criti 
cism. Into this question of the kinds of account provided by the two activities. 
There are three main differences between the two activities: 
first: the worthwhile translation accounts for its original by being physi 
cally plaqu?, almost plastered, against it. Talk of this kind is needed, to raid 
the phenomenon in question. I think this plaquing occurs on either of two planes 
of encounter; either parallel to the original text, against the motion of which it 
seems to lie, absorbing and adequating that text's motion 
at every point; or out 
beyond that text, taking on the text's 
course of movement, receiving, as I said 
initially and repeated in the Char example, the thrust of the text's movement. 
Neither of these positionings?which 
are 
spiritual facts, not metaphors?is com 
pletely what happens. In no 
case does a 
significant parallel translation not also 
recoil, with the original's thrust, back into the ambience of its own language; 
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nor does the thrust-continuing translation ever not in many ways draw continuous 
nourishment from the process we call its original. But in every worthwhile trans 
lation there is the factor of one of these kinds of physical relationship to the 
original. 
Criticism is different. Whether descriptive (Frye), prescriptive (Leavis), 
or metaphysical (Barthes, Staiger), criticism has either a much less sensuous 
relationship to its original, or a much less continuously sensuous one. I think here 
even of Leavis, a hard example; his criticism, though not without great texture 
and density of its own, is far less densely related to its object, say to a Lawrence 
novel, than a good translation of that novel would be. As far as accounting goes, 
criticism is an abstraction. It is for instance much less able than translation to 
account for the process which the original not only is, but on which the original 
depends for everything that deploys and elucidates its own character. 
second: follows from the first difference. Critical choices are indeed op 
erative at every level of translating; on the phrase-level, on the level of the whole 
work. This applies equally to parallel and to arc-continuing kinds of translation. 
These choices, however, operate strictly within the limits set by the original text; 
by that process, in language, which is being converted. This is the constriction 
which the gain in sensuousness costs. It is a great expense. 
There is of course a sense in which the prerequisites for adequate translation 
are unlimited, thus in which we can claim that even the translator's most local 
choices require whatever experience he has had in his own language, and in 
other languages; it following that the translation incarnates the whole its maker 
is, as fully as any original work done. 
In a sense, as I say, this is true; the reason why it is also true, that trans 
lation is a restricting field of choice, is that translating provides only a very small 
aperture through which the translator can draw his generally very large linguis 
tic sensibilities. On occasion?perhaps in Chapman, Pope, and Fitzgerald?this 
very smallness acts as incentive, in the way a prosodie limitation might. And in 
general, I suppose, it does not act 
as a deterrent, merely as a sieve. But that is 
enough. Translation is quite especially 
a 
choosing-against-the-background-of-pre 
arranged-syntax, and thus a choosing in terms of rather presuggested possibilities, 
within the translator's own language. 
Criticism, of any of the varieties I have mentioned, is more distant than 
translation from the process which is its object. (What kinds of account, in fact, 
could be as 
close-fitting as translation?) At the same time criticism is much 
freer in its references and implications, freer than translation to deflect these out 
away from the text it is considering, or to draw them in from other texts. It is 
also free, of course, to select as radically as it can, in finding the details it wants 
to examine, and remaining only with them. It is no requirement of criticism, in 
any of its forms, that it should account for the wholeness of works, or even for 
the whole of them. By contrast with this, the account given by the translator 
seems free chiefly in the freedom of his original decision of which work to treat. 
third: the good translation tends toward fusion, in its own process, with 
the process the original is. If criticism is chiefly a way of trying to say what an 
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original is, translation is chiefly 
a 
way of saying an original. The active 
marrow 
of even the most liberal good translation is on loan. The work of conventional 
criticism is its own substance and its own motor force. Translation, for this rea 
son, tends to be a meaningless notion apart from its original; while criticism, by 
the very least defence, has a half-life of its own; or as someone like Frye might 
imaginably argue, has a kind of ontological priority even to literature, of which 
it names the Ur-forms. 
This is precisely where the difficulty arises, in determining whether trans 
lation is a form of criticism, and it is too important a point to see trapped in ques 
tions of terminology. Translation is in at least two senses 
a 
genuine, informative, 
enriching account of texts. It 
can be, as we saw in the case of the Char, restora 
tion of the forces and values of the original. It can be a way of getting inside 
those values and pushing them out, 
so to 
speak, so that they can be seen with 
fresh words attached to them. And it can be a way of making 
new sensuous 
thematic textures which 'account' for, 'give an account of,' the original's tex 
tures. 
As an 
'account,' however, it lacks distancing, freedom of reference, and the 
power to reify, which are crucial to what we generally consider the acts of pre 
senting the knowable. About these acts there is everything still to say. But as we 
see them beginning to assume definite boundaries, at the end of the spectrum 
of 
species of translation, we have a renewed sense of their usefulness, as defin 
ers of what translation both is and cannot be. This is an oblique, but useful, 
way to talk about what criticism is. 
Fayad Jamis is a Cuban poet (born 1930) who lived five years in 
Paris, and now edits Union, the review of the Cuban writers union. 
His "Por Esta Libertad" is a test case for the theory offered in my 
essay. There is little, almost no, latitude for the translator of this 
poem. Jamis' words are everyday words; but they are not "false 
friends," do not have meanings, in themselves and verbally consid 
ered, which they seem not to have. Yet there is a profound problem 
involved in translating this poem. The poem is a "revolutionary" 
poem, in the special sense Cuban history has given to that word. 
The Cuban meaning of "liberty" shapes the Cuban meaning of "fac 
tories," "oppressors," the "sweet entrails of the people." The Ameri 
can translator can do 
nothing about this problem; he must trans 
late directly and hope for the best. He cannot "criticize" while trans 
lating this poem, except in the sense that not criticizing, here, is cri 
ticizing. 
Fernando Retamar is an established Cuban poet?born in 1930, 
used to hard work like dishwashing in New York City, but now a 
member of the revolutionary authority. This poem of his does not 
present the "revolutionary" problems found in Jamis' poem; it offers 
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opportunities for interpretation. Those opportunities 
are small and 
delicate: how to catch the part physical, part spiritual tone of ligera 
mente sobrehumanos; how to approximate the word resonance in 
comestibles and bebestibles; how to meet the unusually forged ex 
pression, the diecisiete rostros de la sonrisa. We have taken few 
rare 
steps in the translation. But we have tried to compensate lightly, for 
some of our problems, by 
a 
slightly off-normal timbre in 
our version. 
This is often as far as the translator can go toward criticism. But it 
is a long way. 
Frederic Will 
FELICES LOS NORMALES 
Felices los normales, esos seres extra?os. 
Los que no tuvieron una madre loca, un padre 
borracho, un hijo delincuente, 
Una casa en 
ninguna parte, una enfermedad desconocida, 
Los que no han sido calcinados por un amor devorante, 
Los que vivieron los diecisiete rostros de la 
sonrisa y un poco m?s. 
Los llenos de 
zapatos, los arc?ngeles 
con sombreros, 
Los satisfechos, los gordos, los lindos, 
Los rintint?n y sus secuaces, los que c?mo no, por aqu?, 
Los que ganan, los que son queridos hasta la empu?adura, 
Los flautistas 
acompa?ados por ratones, 
Los vendedores y sus compradores, 
Los caballeros ligeramente sobrehumanos, 
Los hombres vestidos de truenos y las mujeres de rel?mpagos, 
los delicados, los sensatos, los finos, 
Los amables, los dulces, los comestibles, y los bebestibles. 
Felices las aves, el esti?rcol, las piedras. 
Pero que den paso a los que hacen los mundos y los sue?os, 
Las ilusiones, las sinfon?as, las palabras que nos desbaratan 
Y nos 
construyen, los m?s locos que sus madres, los m?s borrachos 
Que sus padres y m?s delicuentes que sus hijos 
Y m?s devorados por amores calcinantes. 
Que les dejen su sitio en el infierno, y basta. 
Fernando Retamar 
Criticism 
